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INTRODUCTION

Place yourself in the shoes of Austin Meyer, the inventor of a flight
simulator app who placed his app on Google Play.' You receive a demand
letter threatening litigation unless you pay $50,000, and this demand letter
states that by placing your app on Google Play, you are infringing a patent
that supposedly "invents" the method of selecting a name from a list.2 You
are inexperienced in patent law, so you will have to hire a patent attorney to
resolve the issue. Even if the demand letter appears ridiculous, you realize
that your best option is clear. Preparing for litigation may cost millions of
dollars.3 Alternatively, you can pay only $50,000 to settle the case and make
the issue go away. Because you likely do not have millions of dollars to fund
litigation, you will most likely choose to pay the $50,000 settlement. This
infuriating example highlights how patent trolls have commonly gamed the
system.
Old folk tales described mythical trolls who hid underneath bridges only
to pop up later and demand the payment of a toll. 4 Like these mythical trolls,
those making bad faith assertions of patent infringement generate unearned
revenue by demanding payment of settlement or licensing fees. 5 Because of

1.

Jacob Kleinman, Crazy Patent Troll Suing Devs for Posting Apps to Google Play,

TECHNOBUFFALO (June 7, 2016), http://www.technobuffalo.com/2016/06/07/x-plane-flight-

simulator-patent-troll-uniloc/ (illustrating a real-life example where a South Carolina based
company is involved in patent trolling litigation); Application Developers All., Austin Meyer
of X-Plane Fights Patent Troll &
Wins,
YouTUBE
(May
4,
2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NbyWQS8Ef8.
2.
Application Developers All., supra note 1.
3.
See Michael Pham, The Cost of Defending Against Patent Trolls, WINTECH (July
24, 2014), http://www.wintechblog.com/2014/07/the-cost-of-defending-against-patent-trolls/
(stating that the median and mean costs of patent infringement suits are $1.75M and $2.OM
respectively where the amount in controversy is between $1M and $25M).
4.
Three Billy Goats Gruff, ABRACADABRA, http://abralite.concordia.ca/PD/en/
storyl0.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
5.
See Timothy B. Lee, How Vermont could save the nationfrom patent trolls, WASH.
POST (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/08/01/howvermont-could-save-the-nation-from-patent-trolls/ [hereinafter Lee, Save Nation] (stating that
trolls will send thousands of demand letters hoping that some recipients will settle to avoid
having to hire a lawyer).
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this, those who make bad faith assertions of patent infringement have
become commonly known as patent trolls.

Patent trolling has become an increasingly alarming problem in the
United States. Patent trolling occurs where a person or a company attempts
to enforce patent rights against accusers far beyond the patent's actual value
or contribution to technology. Patent trolls will commonly obtain patents
with overly broad or vague claim language and threaten others with
litigation, sending demand letters claiming that others are infringing the
patents. 9 Most people receiving the demand letters will be uninformed as to
patent law and will presume that the patent is enforceable.'o As noted above,
patent infringement lawsuits may easily exceed one million dollars to
defend, so many small companies and inventors faced with such threats will
choose to simply settle." In 2011, patent trolls cost U.S. entities roughly $29
billion, which is a 400% increase from 2005.12 This figure has likely only
increased in recent years as the overall number of patent infringements has
increased from 2011 to 2015.13 It is estimated that patent troll cases

6.
James Bessen et al., The Private andSocial Cost ofPatent Trolls 3 (Bos. Univ. Sch.
of Law, Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1930272.
7.
See Patent trolls' Cost Other US Bodies $29bn Last Year, Says Study, BBC NEWS
(June 29, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18598559 (stating that patent trolls
cost U.S. entities roughly $29 billion in 2011).
8.
Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit,
Address at the Eastern District of Texas Judicial Conference: The State of Patent Litigation 17
(2011), http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2011/09/raderstateofpatentlit.pdf.
9.
See Lee, Save Nation, supra note 5 (stating that trolls will send thousands of
demand letters hoping that some recipients will settle to avoid having to hire a lawyer).
10. See Patent Trolls, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
patent-trolls/ (stating that small businesses will see a patent license offer as "too attractive to
pass up despite the fact that they are not infringing" on the patent in question).
11. Pham, supra note 3. See also Gil Elbaz, Beating Back the Patent Trolls, NEWCO
SHIFT
(Apr.
20,
2016),
https://shift.newco.co/beating-back-the-patent-trolls9cd769028170#.bdqs5rldi (discussing the costs that a company endured in defending against a
bad faith patent infringement litigation and opining that it would have been cheaper to settle);
Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REv. 375, 397
(2014).
12. Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation, WHITE
HOUSE (June 4, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trollsprotect-american-innovation.
13. See Joe Mullin, Trolls Made 2015 One of the Biggest Years Ever for Patent
Lawsuits, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 5, 2016), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/01/despitelaw-changes-2015-saw-a-heap-of-patent-troll-lawsuits/ (citing 2015 Patent Dispute Report,
UNIFIED PATENTS (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015patent-dispute-report (showing an increase in patent infringement suits from 3499 suits in 2011
to 5769 suits in 2015)).

Published by Scholar Commons,

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [], Art. 10
764

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 68: 761

accounted for 62% of all patent lawsuits in the United States in 2012, an
enormous increase from 19% for the same figure in 2006.14 Thus, there is a
great need to deter against patent trolling to allow commercial and
technological growth.
While patent trolling has had a negative national impact, South
Carolina's economy is also impacted negatively by patent trolling.' Small
companies throughout South Carolina will likely be impacted by the law, as
these companies are the ones that simply cannot afford to defend against
patent infringement suits. 1 Rather than using funding to research and strive

to enhance technology, defendants in patent trolling cases will have to use
funding to defend against frivolous lawsuits.' 7
While patent law has been governed by federal law almost exclusively
in the past," Congress has thus far failed to adequately resolve the patent
trolling issue.1 9 As a result, South Carolina recently passed the Bad Faith
Assertion of Patent Infringement Act ("BFAPIA"), 20 joining 26 other states
in an attempt to proactively resolve this issue.21 Because the wrongful acts in
in South Carolina's BFAPIA are drafted so narrowly, most of its provisions

14. Sperling, supra note 12.
15. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
16. See Sperling, supra note 12 ("40% of technology startups targeted by patent trolls
reported a significant impact on their business operations due the suit or threat thereof");
Elbaz, supra note 11 ("82% of patent troll victims are small and medium sized businesses").
17. See Elbaz, supra note 11 (discussing how it cost close to $1 million and several
hundred hours of executive time to defend a patent infringement suit when the time could have
been used to invest in data and technology).
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) (giving federal district courts original jurisdiction in all
civil actions relating to patents).
19. See Lee, Save Nation, supra note 5 ("[P]atent litigation has become such a nuisance
that state officials have started looking for ways to address the problem.").
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-100 (Supp. 2016).
21. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-12A-i to - 7; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-12-101 to - 104; FLA.
STAT. §§ 501.991-997; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-770 to - 774; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-1701
to - 1708; 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS; IND. CODE §§ 24-11-1-1 to - 5-2; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-6,140; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1428; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 8701-8702; MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-1601 to - 1605; MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-351 to - 357; Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 416.650-658; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-13-151 to - 154; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 359-M:I - 5; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-140 to - 145; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-36-01 to - 08;
OKLA. STAT. TIT. 23, §§ 111-114; OR. LAWS 2014 ch. 19, § 2; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-361 to - 9; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-10-101 to - 104; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. §§ 17.95 1.955; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1901 to - 1905; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-215.1 to .4; VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-4199; WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 19.350.005-900; Wis. STAT.
§ 100.197.
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likely will not be preempted by federal patent law. However, some of the
23
law's provisions may be preempted.
South Carolina's law and other state laws directed toward the patent
troll problem are beneficial in deterring patent troll litigation to some
24
extent, but because of potential preemption issues, state laws must be
relatively narrow in scope.25 Therefore, Congress and federal district courts
likely will need to take action to resolve the issue. Congress should resolve
the patent troll issue at the federal level by creating a single federal law that
explicitly preempts state laws to maintain the consistency and clarity that is
26
vital to patent law. Further, federal district courts need to be more willing
to make patent trolls pay attorney's fees when it is clear that they are acting
27
in bad faith. Additionally, courts also need to be proactive by hearing
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment at earlier stages of
21
litigation to lower the costs of frivolous patent infringement lawsuits.
Section 11(A) explains the patent trolling issue and how it violates the
basic principles of patent law. The development of federal patent laws and a
brief discussion of state laws related to patents are discussed in Section II
(B). Section 11(C) provides an overview of South Carolina's BFAPIA and
discusses other state laws that have similar provisions. Then, Section 11(D)
outlines the preemption framework that has been established in the patent
law context. Section 111(A) will analyze South Carolina's BFAPIA for nonpreemption issues, while a preemption analysis of South Carolina's BFAPIA
is included in Section 111(B). Finally, Section 111(C) will discuss other
possible solutions that federal district courts and Congress could use to
address the patent troll problem.

22. See discussion infra Section III(B).
23. See discussion infra Section III(B).
24. See discussion infra Section III(C).
25. See discussion infra Section III(B).
26. See Ultra-Precision Mfg. Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1378 (citing
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 162-63 (1989) ("Federal patent law
reflects the objectives of Congress to promote 'national uniformity in patent law."')).
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) ("The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party.").
28. See Dennis Crouch, ChiefJudge Rader: Improving PatentLitigation, PATENTLY-O
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/rader-patent-litigation.html (arguing that
an increased use of summary judgment would be effective in limiting litigation expenses in
patent troll cases).
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BACKGROUND

A.

PatentLaw Basics and Patent Trolling Defined

'

While no uniform definition has been adopted for patent trolling, one
observer has stated that patent trolling occurs where a person or a company
attempts to enforce patent rights against accusers far beyond the patent's
actual value or contribution to technology.29 Patent trolls send out demand
letters and strategically make settlement or licensing offers to defendants for
an amount that is less than the price to defend in the lawsuit.30 Recipients of
demand letters will typically choose to settle the case or enter into a
licensing agreement to avoid the costs of defending the suit, saving time and
money that could otherwise go towards other research. 3
Patent trolls frequently assert infringement on the basis of a patent that
is faulty in some way, but a common issue occurs where the underlying
patent is directed to an abstract idea and is therefore not directed to patent
eligible subject matter. A fundamental requirement of patent law is that the
patented invention falls within several categories of patentable subject
32
33
matter. Four categories of patent eligible subject matter exist: (1) process,
34
3'36
(2) machine, (3) manufacture,35 and (4) composition of matter. While
these categories seem to capture almost all conceivable types of inventions,

29. Rader, supra note 8, at 17.
30. See Gene Quinn, Taking Aim at Patent Troll Demand Letters, IPWATCHDOG (July
14,
2014),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/14/taking-aim-at-patent-troll-demandletters/id=50456/ (stating that demand letters typically seek a license payment ranging from
$1,000 to $50,000 and threaten to initiate a patent infringement lawsuit unless the license
payment is paid).
31. Id
32. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
33. See id at § 100(b) (defining process as a "process, art or method, and includes a
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material").
34. Id at § 101; see In re Nuiften, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (defining
machine as "a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of
devices") (quoting Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531, 570 (1863)).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (defining
manufacture to mean "the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by
giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by handlabor or by machinery") (quoting American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11
(1931)).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 101; see Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 308 (defining composition of matter
to include "all compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite articles, whether
they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases,
fluids, powders or solids") (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F.Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C.
1957)).
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courts have created three categories of subject matter that cannot be
patented: (1) physical phenomena,37 (2) laws of nature,38 and (3) abstract
ideas. 39 A key purpose of patent law is to stimulate innovation and the
advancement of technology by exchanging a temporary monopoly of an
invention for full disclosure of the invention to the public. 40 Courts were
fearful that allowing patents for physical phenomena, laws of nature, and
abstract ideas would impede innovation more than it would stimulate it since
these categories are "the basic tools of scientific and technological work." 4 1
The prohibition against patenting abstract ideas has recently created a
large amount of patent litigation. There has always been confusion as to
what is and what is not classified as an abstract idea, which has led to some
patents being granted when they should have been rejected for a failure to
42
recite proper subject matter. Most of the confusion and litigation involving
abstract ideas has been related to computer software.43 Prior to 1981,

37. See NED SNOW, PRINCIPLES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 64 (2016) (stating that a
substance found in nature will be considered an unpatentable physical phenomenon); see also
Assn. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) (finding
that synthetically-created DNA may be patented but that the genetic code found in DNA may
not be patented); see also Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309 (explaining that a living organism that
does not occur in nature may be patented and providing example that "[a] new mineral
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter").
38. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (providing examples of laws of nature, stating
that "Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc 2 ; nor could Newton have patented
the law of gravity").
39. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) ("The
'abstract ideas' category embodies 'the longstanding rule that "[a]n idea of itself is not
patentable."'") (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); see also Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978) (holding that a mathematical formula for computing
alarm limits was an abstract idea that was not eligible for a patent); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct.
3218, 3231 (2010) (finding that a method of hedging against the financial risk of price
fluctuations to be a patent-ineligible abstract idea).
40. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31
(2002).
41. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1292 (2012)
(quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (stating that physical
phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract ideas are "manifestations of . . nature, free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none").
42. Sperling, supra note 12.
43. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP

IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 14 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf (stating
that the overall number of defendants in patent infringement lawsuits have increased by about
129 percent from 2007 to 2011 and that cases involving software-related patents accounted for
89 percent of this increase). See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S.Ct. at 2360 (finding a
computer software program to be an abstract idea and therefore patent ineligible subject
matter); In re TLI Communications LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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computer software could not be patented.44 In 1981, the Supreme Court
decided Diamond v. Diehr and found that computer software could be
patentable, 45 and this led to a large amount of patent applications related to
46
computer software. Unfortunately, there was still confusion as to which
computer software was patentable and which computer software was an
unpatentable abstract idea.4 7 While the current law against abstract ideas is
much clearer than it has been in the past, there is still a large amount of
ambiguity in determining what is and what is not an abstract idea.48 As a
result, there are a large number of patents that have been granted that likely
should have failed the patent eligible subject matter requirement under
§ 101.49 Thus, it is crucial to find a way to invalidate these patents without
impeding in the rights of those with valid patents.
In Alice, a critical 2014 case, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled that it
was much more likely to invalidate a patent as being directed to an abstract
idea, which would indicate that the patent failed to recite statutory subject
matter.50 The Federal Circuit went a step further and found this failure to be
a basic deficiency that should be resolved at the first opportunity." Judge
Mayer believed that doing this would be help minimize the amount of time
and money spent by both the parties and the court.5 2 Judge Mayer also
believed that resolving this early on as a "threshold issue" would work "to

(finding a computer software program to be an abstract idea and therefore patent ineligible
subject matter).
44. Daniel A. Tysver, The History ofSoftware Patents:From Benson, Flook, and Diehr
to Bilski and Mayo v. Prometheus, BITLAW,
http://www.bitlaw.com/softwarepatent/history.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
45. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (finding that a claim solely directed to
a mathematical formula, which is considered an abstract idea, may not obtain a patent but that
a claim merely obtaining or using a mathematical formula within a larger process may be
patentable).
46. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 43, at 14.
47. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S.Ct. at 2358 (stating that a patentee may not merely
take a process that previously existed and place it on a general purpose computer and claim a
patent on it); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(suggesting that claims directed to an improvement in computer functionality are patentable);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (finding that granting a patent for the
implementation of a basic mathematical formula on a general purpose, digital computer would
practically be a patent on the formula itself).
48. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
50. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S.Ct. at 2358 (finding a computer software program
to be an abstract idea and therefore patent ineligible subject matter).
51. OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Mayer, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 1364-65 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007)).
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stem the tide of vexatious suits brought by the owners of vague and
overbroad business method patents."5
While the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit seem to have signaled
that patent eligible subject matter issues should be resolved early on as
threshold issues, other federal district courts seem to make it difficult to
resolve these threshold issues at early stages.54 The Eastern District of Texas
("E.D.T.X") imposes barriers to using summary judgment motions to
invalidate patents for a failure to meet the statutory subject matter
requirement." The E.D.T.X. is well known as one of the most plaintiff
friendly districts in the country for patent infringement suits,16

and

approximately 25% of all patent cases in the United States are filed in the
E.D.T.X. The E.D.T.X. often delays rulings on motions for summary
judgment until the day before trial, forcing the defendants to spend millions
of dollars to prepare to defend themselves in litigation. One has found that
taking a patent case to trial typically costs between $2 million to $4 million
while dismissing a case due to a lack of statutory subject matter may cost
less than $300,000.59 Since approximately 25% of patent law cases are tried

in the E.D.T.X., the procedures of that district
the patent trolling problem nationwide. Thus,
Supreme Court have indicated a willingness
stages, the E.D.T.X. has made it more difficult

will have a large influence on
while the Federal Circuit and
to dispose of cases at early
to dispose of cases early on.

53. Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010)).
54. See Joe Mullin, East Texas Judge's Invention: A Method for Hampering Patent
Defendants, ARS TECHNICA (June 11, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/06/easttexas-judges-invention-a-method-for-hampering-patent-defendants/ (stating that East Texas
has a reputation as a venue of delaying rulings on summary judgment until the eve of trial,
making the district amenable for patent trolls to extract large settlements).
55. Id The E.D.T.X. rules will greatly impact South Carolina consumers, because a
plaintiff may sue a defendant from South Carolina in the E.D.T.X. Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of
Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). See, e.g., Kleinman, supra note 1 (illustrating a real life
example where a company is involved in patent trolling litigation in the E.D.T.X.).
56. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1444, 1445 (2010); Timothy
B. Lee, Courts in Two States are Tilting the Nation's PatentSystem Towards Plaintiffs, WASH.
POST (Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/09/19/
courts-in-two-states-are-tilting-the-nations-patent-system-toward-plaintiffs/.
57. Vera Ranieri, Judges in Texas Unfairly Impose New Requirements on Patent
Defendants, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 10, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2015/06/judges-texas-unfairly-impose-new-requirements-patent-defendants.
58. Mullin, supra note 54.
59. Id
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B. Federaland State Laws GoverningPatents
Despite the fact that patent law has traditionally been created through
legislation at the federal level, state legislatures are now becoming active in
an attempt to resolve the patent trolling issue. The Intellectual Property
Clause of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to govern
patents.6o This clause states "[t]he Congress shall have Power... [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 61 Congress has used this power to create
legislation on almost every aspect patent law in [t]itle 35 of the United States
62
code. For example, under title 35, there is a presumption that a granted
63
patent is valid, and this presumption will be discussed later.
Another provision in title 35 that will be discussed later is § 285, which
allow for reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party in exceptional patent
64
litigation cases. The Supreme Court has defined an exceptional case as
"simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive
strength of a party's litigating position (concerning both the governing law
and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was
litigated."6 5 A district court may determine what constitutes an exceptional
66
case on a case by case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances.
Several examples exist where courts have granted attorney's fees to the
67
defendant in bad faith assertions of patent infringement.
Prior to South Carolina's new law, 26 other states passed laws to deter
68
bad faith assertions of patent infringement. Vermont was the first state to

60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
61. Id.
62. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2012).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) ("A patent shall be presumed valid . .
The burden of
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such
invalidity.").
64. 35 U.S.C. § 285 ("The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party.").
65. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014).
66. Id.
67. E.g., Lumen View Technology, LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc., 24 F.Supp. 3d 329,
331 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (granting attorneys' fees because the case was exceptional under 35
U.S.C. § 285); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2014 WL
2069653, at *6 (D. Md. May 14, 2014) (holding that Biogen was entitled to reasonable
attorneys' fees because they had to defend against a baseless infringement claim).
68. ALA. CODE §§ 8-12A-1 to - 7 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-12-101 to - 104
(2015); FLA. STAT. §§ 501.991-997 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-770 to - 774 (2014);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-1701 to - 1708 (2014); IND. CODE §§ 24-11-1-1 to - 5-2 (2015); 815
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pass a law on the issue.69 The creators of the Vermont law intended to
punish bad faith assertions of patent infringement under state consumer
protection laws.7 0
C.

Overview of South Carolina'sBFAPIA

South Carolina's BFAPIA became effective on July 1, 2016.71 The
stated intent of the Act is "to encourage research, development, and
innovation" to provide jobs and boost the State's economy.72 It is
emphasized that it is not the intent of the General Assembly "to interfere
with . . . good faith patent litigation." 73

1.

Violations

It is a violation to send communications stating that the recipient is
infringing or has infringed a patent and is liable for committing an act listed
in the statute. 74 These acts include:
1)

falsely threatening litigation if "compensation is not paid or the
infringement issue is not otherwise resolved and there is a

-

ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6,140 (2015); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51:1428 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 8701-8702 (2014); MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAW §§ 11-1601 to - 1605 (2014); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-351 to - 357 (2014); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 416.650-.658 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-13-151 to - 154 (2015); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 359-M:1 to :5 (2016); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-140 to - 145 (2014); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 51-36-01 to - 08 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 111-114 (2014); OR. LAWS 2014 ch.
19, § 2; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-36-1 to - 9 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-10-101 to
104 (2014); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. §§ 17.951-955 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78B-6-1901 to - 1905 (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-215.1 to .4 (2014); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-4199 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 19.350.005-.900 (2015); Wis. STAT.
§ 100.197 (2014).
69. See, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (West 2016) (Vermont's state became effective
in 2013).
70. See Lee, Save Nation, supra note 5 (stating "[t]he patent system is federal, but it
works hand in glove with state law" and acknowledging how state law governs the sale and
licensing of patents).
71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-100 (2016).
72. H.R. 3682, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (SC. 2016).
73. Id
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(A) (2016). This subsection also makes it a violation to
induce another into sending communications stating that the recipient is infringing or has
infringed a patent and is liable for committing an act listed in the statute.
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consistent pattern of such threats having been issued and no
litigation having been filed";75
2)

falsely stating that the sender has filed a lawsuit against the
recipient;76

3)

asserting patent rights despite the fact that the sender has no
rights to license or enforce the patent and does not represent
anyone that has such rights;7 7

4)

seeking compensation for infringement of a patent that has been
held

invalid

or unenforceable

in

a

final judicial

or

administrative decision;78
5)

seeking compensation for allegedly infringing activities that
occurred after the patent had expired; 79

6)

failing to include material information such as
a.

the identity of the person asserting the right to license
or enforce the patent;o

b.

the patent number of the patent that has allegedly been
infringed;8

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

S.C.
S.C.
S.C.
S.C.
S.C.
S.C.
S.C.

CODE ANN.

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

§ 39-4-120(A)(1) (2016).
§ 39-4-120(A)(2) (2016).
§ 39-4-120(A)(3)(a) (2016).
§ 39-4-120(A)(3)(b) (2016).
§ 39-4-120(A)(3)(c) (2016).
§ 39-4-120(A)(3)(d)(i) (2016).
§ 39-4-120(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2016).
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factual

allegations

explaining

how the

allegedly

infringing technology infringed the claims of the
82

patent.
7)

failing to include any of the information described in item 6
above and then failing to provide this information within a
reasonable time after the recipient requests the information;8 3

8) failing to conduct

an analysis

comparing the allegedly

infringing technology with the patented technology;8 4
9)

performing the analysis in item 8 above, but failing to identify
how the allegedly infringing technology is covered by the
claims of the patent.

Additionally, the statute makes it a violation for a sender to:
10) demand a response or payment of a license fee within an
unreasonably short period of time;
11) offer to license the patent for an amount that is an unreasonable
estimate of the license's value;

7

12) make an assertion that is based on an interpretation of the patent
that was disclaimed during prosecution, and the sender

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

S.C.
S.C.
S.C.
Id.
S.C.
S.C.

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

§ 39-4-120(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2016).

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

§ 39-4-120(A)(3)(g)
§ 39-4-120(A)(3)(h)
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a.

knows about the disclaimer;"

b.

should have known about the disclaimer;8 9 or

c.

would have known about the disclaimer he had
reviewed the patent's prosecution history." 90

While the majority of § 39-4-120(A) is very similar to what other states
have enacted, 91 the terminology in § 39-4-120(A)(1) is uncommon. That
section made it a violation to falsely threaten litigation if "compensation is
not paid or the infringement issue is not otherwise resolved and there is a
consistent pattern of such threats having been issued and no litigation having
been filed." 92 Only three of the other twenty-six state statutes use the same
language or substantially similar language as is used in § 39-4-120(A)(1). 93
Illinois makes it a violation to make a communication which "falsely
threatens that administrative or judicial relief will be sought if compensation
is not paid or the infringement issue is not otherwise resolved." 94 Virginia
makes it a violation to make an assertion of patent infringement where the
person threatens legal action without actually intending to take legal
action.95

88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(A)(3)(i) (2016).
89. Id
90. Id
91. ALA. CODE § 8-12A-2 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-12-102 (2013); FLA. STAT.
§ 501.991 (SUPP. 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-771 (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-1703
(2014); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS (2015); IND. CODE § 24-11-3-1 to - 3 (2015); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 50-6,140 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1428 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT.
14, § 8701 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-1603 (2013); Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.652
(2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-152 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-M:2 (2016);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-143 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-36-02 (2016); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 646A.810 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-36-2 (2015); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN.
§ 17.952 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1903 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-215.2
(2014); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, § 4197 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE. § 19.350.020 (2015); Wis.
STAT. § 100.197 (2015).
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(A)(1) (2016).
93. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-353(1)(a) (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 112 (A)(1)
(2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-10-102 (a)(1) (West 2014).
94. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS (b)(1).
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-215.2(B)(6) (2014).
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Immunization Provision

While § 39-4-120(A)(1) and other provisions may seem to expose a
wide array of patent owners to potential liability, certain owners are
96
immunized from liability under South Carolina's statute. These owners
include institutions of higher learning, a manufacturer, "any owner of a
patent who is using the patent in connection with substantial research,
development, production, manufacturing, processing or delivery of products
or materials," technology transfer organizations, and those seeking to obtain
relief under § 271(e)(2).97
3.

Punishmentof Violations

For those who commit violations and who do not fall within the
immunization provisions described above, South Carolina's BFAPIA allows
for several potential punishments.9 The Attorney General may recover a
civil penalty of up to $50,000 per violation if a court finds that a person
willfully violated the statute and the person knew or should have known that
its conduct was in violation of the statute.99 Additionally, a recipient may
assert a cause of action if she lost money or property as a result of a bad faith
assertion of patent infringement. 1 If the court finds that violation was
committed willingly or knowingly, then the court will award three times the
actual damages sustained and can provide additional relief as it deems
necessary.' 0 In addition, for each violation, the court will award reasonable
attorney's fees and costs to the person bringing the action.102
D. PreemptionFramework
While South Carolina's BFAPIA provides several beneficial properties,
it is important to ensure that this law will not be preempted by federal law.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
federal law is the supreme law of the land.103 Since the Supreme Court's

96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(C) (2016).
97. Id.
98. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4-130(B), 140(A) (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(A)
(2016).
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-130(B).
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-140(A); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(A).
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(A) (2016).
102. Id.
103. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
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interpretation of the Supremacy Clause in M'Culloch v. Maryland, it has
been well settled that a state law that conflicts with a federal law will be
preempted and will be "without effect."1 04 However, in dealing with
preemption issues generally, there is a presumption against preemption of
state laws. 105 State law may be preempted by federal law through explicit,
field, and conflict preemption. o0 An analysis of these forms of preemption
will be presented in the subsections below.
1.

Explicit Preemption

Explicit preemption occurs where Congress explicitly states that it is
withdrawing powers from the states. 0 7 Federal patent law does not make
any explicit statement that it is withdrawing powers from the states, so the
state laws related to patents are not explicitly preempted. 108
2.

FieldPreemption

For field preemption, a state law is preempted when it regulates conduct
in a field that Congress implicitly intends the federal government to occupy
exclusively.1 09 This congressional intent may be inferred where the scheme
of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."'' 0 Alternatively,
the requisite congressional intent for field preemption may be inferred where
congressional legislation "touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject.""' Further, in situations where defining the
field in question is difficult, some courts have stated that conflict preemption

the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.").
104. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).
105. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("[I]t is presumed that Congress does not 'cavalierly' preempt state law causes of
action. . . ") (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
106. Id.
107. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990) ("Congress can define
explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law.").
108. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376; Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1332.
109. HunterDouglas, 153 F.3d at 1332.
110. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
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allows for a more precise means of determining preemption and is, therefore,
more appropriate than using field preemption.112 Field preemption did not
apply in cases related to state unfair competition law, 113 state trade secret
law,11 4 determining ownership of the patent after divorce," and determining
ownership of a patent during a probate dispute.' These cases and other
cases will be discussed further below.
3.

Conflict Preemption

Like field preemption, conflict preemption relies on an implicit intent by
Congress to preempt state law. 117 Conflict preemption may occur where the
state law actually conflicts with federal law, making it impossible for a
private party to comply with both state and federal laws." Alternatively,
conflict preemption may occur where state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."119
In order to determine if a federal patent law preempts a state law
through conflict preemption, it is important to understand the primary
objectives of federal patent law. The three primary objectives exist in federal
patent law: (1) to foster and reward invention; (2) to promote disclosure of
inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice
the invention once the patent expires; (3) to assure that ideas in the public
domain remain there for the free use of the public.120 These three categories
of preemption are not rigidly distinct; for example, preemption may occur
under both conflict and field preemption.121

112. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
113 Id. at 1333-35.
114. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-93 (1974) (finding that
preemption did not apply, but the Court bases its analysis mostly on conflict preemption
principles). See also id. at 493-95 (Marshall, J., concurring) (finding that field preemption did
not apply).
115. Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., 614 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(determining that the question of who has legal title to a patent is a question of state law and
that this has traditionally been a question of state law).
116. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (applying state probate law
without even considering the field preemption issue).
117. Id. at 1332.
118. Id
119. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
120. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (citing Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974)).
121. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990).
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Cases Finding That State Law Was Preempted by Federal
PatentLaw

Regarding communications asserting patent infringement, the Federal
Circuit has held in Globetrotterthat state tort claims can survive preemption
only to the extent that those claims are based on a showing of bad faith in
asserting infringement.122 Further, the court held that even if the
communications suggested subjective bad faith, state law claims would not
be preempted unless the assertions of infringement were objectively
baseless. 12 Globetrotter involved state law claims for tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage and unfair competition.124 The court

stated:
[F]ederal patent law preempts state-law tort liability for a
patentholder's good faith conduct in communications asserting
infringement of its patent and warning about potential litigation.
State-law claims .

.

. can survive federal preemption only to the

extent that those claims are based on a showing of "bad faith"
action in asserting infringement. Accordingly, to avoid preemption,
"bad faith must be alleged and ultimately proven, even if bad faith
is not otherwise an element of the tort claim."1 25
After finding that the patent infringement claims were not objectively
baseless, the court held that the state law claims were preempted by federal
patent law.126

Two district court cases have led one commentator to conclude that a
state cannot condemn false threats of litigation.127 In In re Innovatio, a
patent owner sent more than 8,000 demand letters accusing the recipients of
infringing patents related to Wi-Fi technology. 12 Several manufacturers
filed a complaint against the patent owner alleging, among other things, that
the patent owner's
demand letters possessed
a variety of

122. Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (citing Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
123. Id. at 1375.
124. Id. at 1368.
125. Id. at 1374 (quoting Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1355).
126. Id. at 1375.
127. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F.Supp.2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2013);
Activision TV, Inc. v. Bruning, No. 8:13-cv-215, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190075, at *19-21
(D. Neb. 2014); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REv. 1579,
1632 (2015).
128. In re Innovatio, 921 F.Supp.2d at 907.
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misrepresentations.129 The manufacturers alleged that the patent owner
overstated the value and number of licenses that it had granted on its
patents.1 30 The manufacturers also alleged that the patent owner had
misrepresented the number of its patents that had been confirmed when only
one of the patents had actually been confirmed at the USPTO.131 The district
court found that none of these alleged misstatements were sufficiently
central to the infringement claims to make the demand letters objectively
baseless.132 Reasoning that these misstatements were not material enough to
affect the outcome of a litigation proceeding, the court found that the
licensing campaign was not a sham and dismissed the relevant claims. 133
In a second district court case, the court found that there may be no
cause of action for a state law violation unless there is evidence of objective
baselessness in the underlying infringement allegations.1 34 The state attorney
general issued a cease and desist order that enjoined a law firm from sending
additional demand letters to potential patent infringers.1 35 In this order, the
attorney general alleged that the law firm had made several
misrepresentations in its demand letters.136 These alleged misrepresentations
include statements that many other businesses had already purchased
licenses and also that the law firm intended to file suit against businesses
who decided not to purchase a license.137 The court granted an injunction on
the attorney general's cease and desist order, reasoning that the attorney
general had not alleged that the infringement allegations were inaccurate.1 38
This holding and the In re Innovatio holding have led another commentator
to conclude that "so long as infringement allegations themselves are not

129. Id at 908.
130. Id
131. Id at 908-09.
132. Id at 921.
133. Id at 921-22. For a more extensive analysis of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and
First Amendment issues related to licensing campaigns and sending demand letters, see
Gugliuzza, supra note 127, at 1585-87.
134. Activision TV, Inc. v. Bruning, No. 8:13-cv-215, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190075, at
*19-21 (D. Neb. 2014).
135. 1st Am. Compl., ¶ 76, Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., No. 8:13-cv215 (D. Neb. 2014).
136. Id. at 1-2.
137. Br. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. at 22-24, Activision TV, Inc. v. Bruning, No. 8:13-cv-215
(D. Neb. 2014).
138. See Activision TV, Inc. v. Bruning, No. 8:13-cv-215, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
190075, at *18-21 (D. Neb. 2014) (stating that the determination of whether actions are
objectively baseless focus on validity and infringement).

Published by Scholar Commons,

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [], Art. 10
780

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 68: 761

objectively baseless, patent holders have, in essence, 'a legal right to lie."'13 9
Thus, SC's BFAPIA and other state laws may create violations for false and
misleading statements, but it seems that these laws must limit these
violations to infringement related issues.
In Compco, the Supreme Court held that a state law allowing parties to
file suit for the copying of unpatented articles was preempted where it
impeded the free access to copy whatever the federal patent laws leave in the
public domain.1 40 The plaintiff invented a feature for lighting fixtures but
failed to obtain a patent for the invention.141 The defendant then
incorporated a feature into its own lighting fixtures that was very similar to
the plaintiffs feature, and the plaintiff then sued the defendant under a state
unfair competition claim.142 Despite the fact that the plaintiff failed to obtain
a patent on the features, state law permitted a cause of action under unfair
competition for copying aspects of an industrial design. 143 Because the
plaintiff failed to obtain the patent and practiced the invention in commerce,
the court determined that the invention entered the public domain. 144 Thus,
the state law was in conflict with the third objective of patent law, which is
to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the
public, so the state law was preempted.145
5.

Cases Finding That State Law Was Not Preempted by Federal
PatentLaw

Other state laws regulating issues related to patents have not been
preempted. This seems to create some room for state legislatures to regulate
a limited range of patent related issues.
For example, a state contract law has overcome preemption challenges
where it governed agreements to license or assign a patent.146 In deciding
this case, the Supreme Court stated that "[c]ommercial agreements
traditionally are the domain of state law."1 47 The Court then found that the

139. Gugliuzza, supra note 127, at 1631 (quoting Steven Seidenberg, Patent Trolls Are
Getting First Amendment Protection for Their Demand Letters, ABA J. (May 1 2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/patent trolls aregettingfirst amendment.prote
ctionfordemandletters).
140. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
141. Id. at 234.
142. Id. at 234-35.
143. Id. at 234.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 237.
146. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262-66 (1979).
147. Id. at 262.
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state law did not violate any of the three objectives of federal patent law.1 48
First, it found that the state law actually encouraged invention by providing
royalties to patent owners.1 49 Second, the Court found that the state licensing
law encouraged disclosure of inventions.so Third, the enforcement of a
licensing agreement under state licensing law did not withdraw any idea
from the public domain.'' Based on these findings, the Supreme Court
determined that the state contract law was not preempted.152
In Kewanee Oil, the Supreme Court held that a state trade secret law did
not preempt federal patent law as the law did not conflict with the three
fundamental objectives of patent law.1 53 The state law in question allowed
trade secret protection for inventions that had been used in commerce for
over a year.1 54 In analyzing the first objective of federal patent law, the
Court quickly found that the state trade secret law fostered and encouraged
invention by giving protection under the law to inventors. 5 5 The Court's
analyses of the second and third objectives were much more detailed.
For the second objective promoting disclosure of inventions-the
Court determined that the state trade secret law did not create any conflict.
Where the patentability of an invention was not likely or uncertain, the Court
recognized that a large number of patents would not be granted. 5 7 Not
allowing trade secret protection would merely delay the use of these
inventions as they would be kept confidentially until their rejection.5 8 By
allowing trade secret as an alternative, the Court believed that some of the
inventions contained in these rejected applications would be disclosed at an
earlier date through trade secret protected-licensing agreements.1 59

148. Id. at 262-64.
149. Id. at 262.
150. Id. at 262-63.
151. Id. at 263.
152. Id. at 262-66.
153. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484-93 (1974).
154. Id at 474. By using an invention for over a year, an inventor would be barred from
patenting her invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 484-93.
157. Id. at 484-90.
158. Id. at 485. It is important to note that this case was decided in 1974. In determining
that trade secret law did not conflict with the objective of promoting disclosure, the court
relied on the version of 35 U.S.C. § 122 which existed at the time. This version stated that all
patents were kept confidentially, meaning that failed patent applications would not publish.
See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1975). The current, amended version of 35 U.S.C. § 122 states that all
patent applications will be published unless the patent applicant requests that it is not
published or another exception applies. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2012). Therefore, the reasoning
of the court here may not be valid under the current law.
159. Id. at 488.
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Additionally, the Court determined that even for clearly patentable
inventions, this second objective was not violated.160 The Court reasoned
that patent law protection would be much stronger than trade secret law,
stating that "[w]here patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions
relatively as a sieve."' 6' Because of this, the court concluded that there was a
very remote possibility that an inventor would choose trade secret protection
over patent protection.162 Thus, the Court determined that the state trade
secret law did not conflict with the second objective of federal patent law,
which was to promote disclosure of inventions.163
The Court in Kewanee Oil also found that the state trade secret law did
not conflict with the third objective of federal patent law - assuring that
ideas in the public domain remain there for the use of the public.164 The

court determined that the state law did not remove any inventions which had
already reached the public domain, stating that "by definition a trade secret
has not been placed in the public domain." 6 5 It continued, stating that an
invention may be in public use or on sale without losing its secret
character. 1 Accordingly, the Court found that this state trade secret law did
not violate the third objective of federal patent law, which was to assure that
ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.

Thus, the Court found that the state trade secret law was not preempted since
the law did not conflict with any of the three objective of federal patent
law. 168

The majority in Kewanee Oil applied conflict preemption principles and
determined that preemption did not apply.169 However, Justice Marshall
wrote a concurring opinion that applied field preemption principles.1 7 0 He

160. Id. at 489-92.
161. Id. at 489-90 (citing Painton, 442 F.2d at 224) (additionally stating that patent law
protects against independent inventions made by fair and honest means while trade secret law
does not; also stating that there is a substantial risk that an invention protected by trade secret
may be given to competitors, by theft or confidential relationship, in a way that may be very
difficult to prove).
162. Id. at 490.
163. Id. at 491-92.
164. Id. at 484.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 484 n.13 (citing Painton, 442 F.2d at 224 n.6 (2nd Cir. 1971); Metallizing
Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2nd Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946)).
167. Id. at 484.
168. Id. at 491-92.
169. Id. at 482-93.
170. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493-95 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
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stated that state trade secret laws and federal patent laws have co-existed for
many years and Congress did not disapprove of state trade secret laws
during that time.1 7 ' Based on this information, Justice Marshall concluded
that Congress did not implicitly intend for federal law to preempt state trade
secret law, so he found that field preemption should not apply.172
Other Federal Circuit cases have shown that state law typically
determines who owns a patent in a variety of contexts.173 For example, in a
2010 case, the Federal Circuit determined that state family law governs who
is awarded a patent after a divorce.1 74 In that case, the Federal Circuit,
without going into a conflict preemption analysis, stated that determining
who has legal title to a patent is a question of state law and that this has
traditionally been a question of state law. 7 5 Additionally, in a 1983 case, the
Federal Circuit determined that state probate law governs who is awarded a
patent upon a patent owner's death. 1 The court applied the probate law
without addressing the possibility that it should be preempted. These cases
show that, in areas that have traditionally been governed by state law, courts
have sometimes foregone the preemption analysis and quickly concluded
that preemption did not apply.
These cases show that well-drafted state legislation dealing with patent
related issues will not be preempted as long as the state legislation avoids
violating any of the three main objectives of federal patent law. 178
Additionally, for some issues that have been traditionally governed by state
law such as ownership of a patent, courts have felt comfortable in quickly
concluding that the state laws were not preempted without entering a conflict
preemption analysis. 179

171. Id. at 494.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., 614 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
174. Enovsys, 614 F.3d at 1342.
175. Id. at 1342 (citing Akazawa v. Link New Tech., 520 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997))
("[T]he question of who owns the patent rights and on what terms typically is a question
exclusively for state courts. . . . [T]hat has long been the law.").
176. Stickle, 716 F.2d at 1557-58 (citing V.A.T.S. Probate Code § 37).
177. See id. (determining that Texas state probate law should apply without discussing
any potential preemption issues with federal patent law).
178. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (surviving
conflict preemption by not conflicting with any of the three main objectives of patent law);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (surviving conflict preemption by not
conflicting with any of the three main objectives of patent law).
179. See, e.g., Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., 614 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(stating that, in the context of a divorce, ownership of a patent was a question of state divorce
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Analysis of South Carolina's BFAPIA
Preemption

for Issues Unrelated to

784
III. ANALYSIS

A.

1.

Section 39-4-120(A) PresentsIssues with Enforcement

The main clause of the BFAPIA statue appears to be § 39-4-120(A)(1)
as it seems to capture a large amount of people alleging infringement, but
there may be several issues with the enforcement of this provision. Section
39-4-120(A)(1) makes it a violation to falsely threaten litigation where there
is a consistent pattern of litigation being threatened but no such litigation
being filed.8 o This provision creates several issues with enforcement.
First, many threats may never be discovered due to the fact that the
cases may be settled.
When cases are settled, the details of the case
typically remain confidential.182 The confidentiality resulting from these
settlement agreements may make it difficult to prove a consistent pattern of
false threats being made without litigation being filed.
Furthermore, inclusion of the word falsely in the statute language
significantly lowers the amount of number of potential violators of § 39-4120(A)(1).183 By including the word falsely, the statute seems to require a
showing that the sender threatened litigation when he had no intent of ever
filing litigation. Because the additional element of intent seems to be
required, this statute will penalize less than it would if the element of intent
was otherwise not present, making this statute narrower in its application.
Additionally, proving a subjective intent may be difficult to do. Thus, the
inclusion of the word falsely greatly lowers the amount of potential
violators.

law and state divorce law traditionally applied in the past); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d
1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (deciding that state probate law applied without even addressing
preemption issues).
180. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(A)(1) (2016).
181. Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV.
375, 407 (2014).
182. Id.
183. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(A)(1) (2016).
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Section 39-4-120(C) Creates Exceptions That Immunize
CertainPartiesfrom Liability

Section 39-4-120(C) seems to limit the application of the law to nonpracticing entities.184 Non-practicing entities are those who do not
commercially practice the patented technology they own but instead
generate revenue through licensing. s1 The law specifically creates an
exception immunizing those who use the patent "in connection with
substantial research, development, production, manufacturing, processing, or
delivery of products." 6 Thus, this immunization ensures that SC's BFAPIA
is narrowly construed to target non-practicing entities.
This immunization is arguably a very beneficial provision as it prevents
potential liability for certain entities such as universities, manufacturers, and
others that have traditionally been key sources of innovation. By preventing
potential liability for these entities under SC's BFAPIA, these entities may
continue using their resources towards further research. Additionally, the
stated intent of the Act is "to encourage research, development, and
innovation" to provide jobs and boost the State's economy.is? The
immunization provision places SC's BFAPIA more in line with this stated
intent.
It may be argued that the statute unfairly targets non-practicing entities
by immunizing virtually all other parties. Manufacturers and researchers
frequently obtain a large number of patents. Active enforcement of these
patents can sometimes be very costly and time consuming, so these
manufacturers and researchers may decide to sell their patents to a patent
holding company. Some of these patent holding companies would be
considered a non-practicing entity since they do not actually make or
research the invention but merely enforce the patent. However, it can be
argued that these patent holding companies should not be targeted since they
foster and reward invention-inventors may create an invention and be
rewarded for their invention by selling it to a patent holding company.
Overall, the immunization provisions of South Carolina's BFAPIA seem
to be very beneficial. The immunization provisions of South Carolina's
BFAPIA seem to be very beneficial in preventing liability for entities that

184. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(C) (2016).
185. Michael Liu, Joinder Under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent
Assertions Away From Small Businesses, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 489, 491
(2012).
186. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(C)(1) (2016).
187. H.R. 3682, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (SC. 2016).
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are key sources of innovation. These beneficial aspects of the provision
seem to outweigh any negative aspects.
B. Some Provisions in South Carolina'sBFAPIA May Be Preempted
Some provisions within South Carolina's BFAPIA may be preempted
by federal patent law. However, the majority of the statute will survive
preemption. Federal patent law does not explicitly state anywhere that it is
preempting any particular state law related to patents, so express preemption
does not apply."s
1.

FieldPreemption Likely Should Not Apply to SC's BFAPIA

It is unlikely that South Carolina's law will be nullified under field
preemption. State laws against patent trolling that have been created have
been directed towards consumer protection laws, which have traditionally
been an area covered by state law,19 and South Carolina's BFAPIA largely
mirrors these other state laws.1 90 South Carolina's BFAPIA does not seem to
directly protect end consumers.191 However, if the statute did not exist and
the prohibited acts went unpunished, then the end costs of these acts would
eventually trickle down to the end consumers. Thus, South Carolina's
BFAPIA and similar statutes in other states seem to be related to consumer
protection laws.192

For other areas of law that the states have traditionally covered, courts
have found that field preemption did not apply. Field preemption did not
apply in cases related to state unfair competition law,1 93 state trade secret
law,1 94 determining ownership of the patent after divorce,1 95 and determining

188. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
189. See Lee, Save Nation, supra note 5 (stating that bad faith threats are violations of
state consumer protection laws).
190. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120 (2016) (largely creating violations that are very
similar to the violations created in other states).
191. See id. (creating violations that directly harm the recipients of bad faith assertions of
patent infringement).
192. See Lee, Save Nation, supra note 5 (stating that bad faith threats are violations of
state consumer protection laws).
193. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1333-35 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
194. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-93 (1974) (finding that
preemption did not apply, but the Court bases its analysis mostly on conflict preemption
principles). See also id. at 493-95 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (finding that field
preemption did not apply).
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ownership of a patent during a probate dispute.196 Thus, proponents of state
BFAPIA laws may argue that the laws should receive similar treatment.
On the other side of the argument, opponents of the state BFAPIA may
argue that federal law has traditionally been the exclusive source governing
patents and that field preemption should apply.1 97 District courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction for any civil action arising under any
legislation related to patents.1 98 Further, the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction for appeals of district court cases related to patents.1 99 The
reasoning behind hearing such cases in the Federal Circuit is to maintain
200
uniformity in the application of patent law.
Maintaining nationwide
uniformity in patent law was also mentioned as an objective of patent law in
Federal Circuit cases.201 Because the emphasis on uniformity and
consistency is clear, it may be argued that state laws covering key areas of
patent law will be impliedly preempted to obtain this uniformity and
consistency.
When determining if field preemption applies, a court must determine if
Congress had the clear and manifest purpose for federal patent law to
exclusively occupy the "field in question." 202 Here, it seems that Congress
did not have the clear and manifest purpose for federal patent law to
exclusively control state consumer protection laws that involve patents. As
stated previously, the Federal Circuit found that a state unfair competition
203
law was not preempted by federal patent law. Because unfair competition
laws are closely related to consumer protection laws, it seems that federal
patent law is unlikely to preempt consumer protection laws through field
preemption. Also, consumer protection law and patent law have different
origins, protect different rights, and have long existed as distinct and

195. Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., 614 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(determining that the question of who has legal title to a patent is a question of state law and
that this has traditionally been a question of state law).
196. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (applying state probate law
without even considering the field preemption issue).
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) (giving federal district courts original jurisdiction in all
civil actions relating to patents).
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).

199. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
200. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989).
201. Id. at 162-63.
202. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1218, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (concluding that field preemption did not apply as "there is no reason to believe that the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress was for federal patent law to occupy exclusively the
field pertaining to state unfair competition law").
203. Id.
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204

independent bodies of law.
While patent law is an area that has been
governed almost exclusively by federal law, consumer protection laws have
largely been left to the states to govern.20 Additionally, Title 35, which
contains the statutes related to patents, does not provide any law related to
206
bad faith assertions of patent infringement.
Because these areas of law
appear to be distinct and because there is a presumption against
207
preemption,
it appears very doubtful that Congress intended for federal
patent law to preempt state consumer protection laws in this situation. Thus,
South Carolina's BFAPIA likely will not be nullified based on field
preemption principles.
2.

Conflict Preemption May Apply in Certain Factual Situations,
but the South Carolina'sBFAPIA Should Not Be Nullified as a
Whole

The majority of the provisions in SC's BFAPIA seem to be drafted very
carefully to avoid punishing good faith actors and to avoid frustrating the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.208 However, some provisions seem to punish good faith conduct,
so these provisions may be preempted.
Most of SC's BFAPIA does not seem to conflict with any of the three
primary objectives of patent law, which are: 1) to foster and reward
invention; (2) to promote disclosure of inventions to stimulate further
innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent
expires; (3) to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the
free use of the public.209 For instance,

§ 39-4-120

penalizes bad faith

assertions where the patent that was allegedly being infringed has expired or

204. See Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1333 (arguing that the general statutory framework
granting federal law control of patents and state law control of unfair competition law indicates
that they were intended to be distinct areas) (citing Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon
Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
205. Id.
206. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2012).
207. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("[I]t is presumed that Congress does not 'cavalierly' preempt state law causes of
action. . . ") (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
208. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(A)(1) (2016) (stating that it is a violation to
"[f]alsely threaten[] litigation if compensation is not paid or the infringement issue is not
otherwise resolved and there is a consistent pattern of such threats having been issued and no
litigation having been filed," which does not foster or reward invention like patent law does
but rather acts to deter invention).
209. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 257 (1979).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss4/10

28

Todd: Stopping the Troll Tax: An Analysis of the Patent Troll Issue and
2017]

PATENT LAW

789

been held unenforceable.210 These assertions of infringement would each be
objectively baseless and punishment of these assertions would not
undermine any of the three primary objectives. Instead, such provisions are
consistent with the objectives of patent law, 21' as both would permit the
public to practice the invention once the patent expires and would ensure
that ideas in the public domain remain there for free use of the public.
Section 39-4-120(A)(1) may be preempted. This provision states that it
is a violation to "falsely threaten[] litigation if compensation is not paid or
the infringement issue is not otherwise resolved and there is a consistent
pattern of such threats having been issued and no litigation having been
filed." 2 12 A key word in this clause is the word falsely. Without this word,
this clause seems to create liability for a large number of good faith actors
who may have a history of settling disputes prior to even filing a lawsuit.
Such a pattern by itself does not seem to correlate to a showing of bad faith,
making the punishment of this conduct seem improper. However, because
the word falsely is present, it seems that an even more consistent pattern of
false threats must be proven. While a substantial amount of case law
supports a patent owner's right to publicize their patents in the marketplace
and threaten alleged infringers with suit, 213 these threats must still be made
214

in good faith.
Section 39-4-120(A)(1) seems to assert that those making false threats
of filing patent infringement suits are acting in bad faith, 215 but it can be
argued that this assertion is not true. Some patent owners may not have the
funds to actively pursue patent infringement suits against all potential
infringers. Therefore, when these patent owners make false threats of
litigation, it can be argued that they are pursuing their only realistic option
and are not acting in bad faith. If this argument is found persuasive, then §

210. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(A)(3)(b)-(c) (2016).
211. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(A) (2016) (connecting the state's bad faith
prohibition to the assertion of a United States patent).
212. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(A)(1) (2016).
213. See Concrete Unlimited Inc. v. Cementeraft, Inc., 776 F.2d 1537, 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (stating that a patentholder "did only what any patent owner has the right to do to
enforce its patent, and that includes threatening alleged infringers with suit"); Virtue v.
Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 227 U.S. 8, 37-38 (1913) ("Patents would be of little value if
infringers of them could not be notified of the consequences of infringement or proceeded
against in the courts. Such action considered by itself cannot be said to be illegal.").
214. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("[F]ederal patent law bars the imposition of liability for publicizing a patent in the
marketplace unless the plaintiff can show that the patentholder acted in bad faith.").
215. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(A)(1) (2016) (stating that there is bad faith if there
is a consistent pattern of false threats having been issued and no litigation having been filed).
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39-4-120(A)(1) would be punishing good faith actions in violation of the
principles stated in Globetrotter.
Another commentator has asserted that a state cannot condemn false
216
threats of litigation.
Based on the reasoning in the decisions of district
courts in Illinois and Nebraska, the commentator stated that a patent holder
may make false statements if those statements "do not relate to the issues of
patent validity or infringement." 217 This article stated that "so long as
infringement allegations themselves are not objectively baseless, patent
holders have, in essence, 'a legal right to lie."' 218 Because this commentary
is based on the reasoning of district court decisions, it will not have a
binding effect on most jurisdictions. However, it provides further support for
the possible preemption of § 39-4-120(A)(1).
Another provision that may deal with preemption issues is § 39-4120(A)(3)(d). This section requires the sender to include important
information when making a threat of filing a patent infringement suit.219

This information includes the identity of the person asserting the right
license or enforce the patent, the patent number of the patent that has
allegedly been infringed, and the factual allegations explaining how the
allegedly infringing technology infringed the claims of the patent.220
Failing to include the information required in § 39-4-120(A)(3)(d) does
not necessarily equate to a bad faith action. Senders may assert infringement
in good faith and simply make a mistake by omitting this information.
Others have found provisions such as these to be "almost certainly invalid,"
reasoning that the provisions would punish accurate patent infringement
assertions that were made in good faith.221 Because this provision seems to
punish good faith conduct that is not objectively baseless, it may be
preempted.
It seems that § 39-4-120(A)(1) and § 39-4-120(A)(3)(d) may be
preempted, but the remainder of SC's BFAPIA will likely not be preempted
since these provisions limit violations only to bad faith acts that are
objectively baseless. However, even in the event that a court finds that some

216. Gugliuzza, supranote 127, at 1632.
217. Id. (citing In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F.Supp.2d 903 (N.D.
Ill. 2013); Activision TV, Inc. v. Bruning, No. 8:13-cv-215, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190075
(D. Neb. 2014)).
218. Gugliuzza, supra note 127, at 1632 (quoting Steven Seidenberg, Patent Trolls are
Getting First Amendment Protection for Their Demand Letters, ABA J. (May 1 2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/patent trolls aregettingfirst amendmentprote
ctionfordemandletters).
219. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-120(A)(3)(d) (2016).
220. Id.
221. Gugliuzza, supranote 127, at 1631-32 (2015).
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provision in SC's BFAPIA should be preempted, it is highly unlikely that
the entire law will be preempted. Courts have been hesitant to preempt a law
222
on its face and have tended to use an as applied approach instead.
A state
law is not preempted per se unless every fact situation that would satisfy the
223
state law is in conflict with federal law.
Thus, even if there are certain
factual situations where it appears that this statute should be preempted
under conflict preemption principles, the vast majority of factual situations
still would likely not present conflicts with the purposes of federal patent
law. Thus, the law as a whole is unlikely to be preempted.
C. Action Can Be Taken at the Federal Level to Address Patent
Trolling Issues
State law should not inhibit a patent owner's right to enforce her patent
solely because of statutory subject matter issues. Even if a patent appears to
be directed to an abstract idea, there is a presumption that a granted patent is
224
valid. Unless the patent is declared invalid through a court proceeding or
through proceedings at the USPTO, patent owners should be permitted to
assert their patent rights freely. If states were to punish such conduct, then
good faith actors likely would still be subject to violations, and this would
inhibit the primary patent law objectives of fostering invention and
promoting disclosure of inventions since inventors would potentially be less
likely to seek patents. Thus, where there is a dispute over whether an issued
patent should be invalidated as being directed to an abstract idea, SC's
BFAPIA and other state laws should not apply unless the patent owner takes
some additional action indicating bad faith.
Since these state laws likely cannot be passed to invalidate patents for
failure to meet statutory subject matter requirements, action should be taken
elsewhere to sort out bad-faith assertions of patent infringement and goodfaith ones. To do this, courts should be more willing to dismiss cases
through motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. While rules
and practices like those in the Eastern District of Texas bring a large number

222. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (stating that a state law is not per se preempted unless every fact situation that would
satisfy the state law is in conflict with federal law); see also California Coastal Comm'n v.
Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 593 (1987) (refusing to preempt state regulations in their
entirety due to a conflict with federal law because there was a "possible set of permit
conditions not in conflict with federal law").
223. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1335.
224. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) ("A patent shall be presumed valid .... The burden of
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such
invalidity.").
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of cases onto the docket in that district,225 these rules and practices of the
district likely should be removed as they are fundamentally unfair and put
too much pressure on defendants to settle in patent infringement suits. The
E.D.T.X. rules and other district court rules should be changed to allow for
the earlier resolution of cases to minimize the costs of defending against
frivolous patent infringement suits. Rather than forcing defendant's to go to
trial and pay millions of dollars, earlier resolution of cases on motions for
summary judgment or motions to dismiss could reduce a defendant's
litigation costs to roughly $300,000.226 If enough cases are resolved at the
summary judgment or pleading stage, then the average cost of defending
such suits will decrease, which will likely cause patent trolls to settle cases
for less money and increase the willingness of defendants to go to litigation
and invalidate patents. If the amount that patent trolls settle their cases for
decreases enough to where the risks of penalties outweigh the rewards from
settlement agreements, then patent trolls may eventually choose to stop
pursuing frivolous lawsuits against defendants.
Also, courts should be more willing to grant attorney's fees to
defendants in patent trolling suits, which would increase the risk of penalties
for patent trolls. Section 285 grants courts the power to grant attorney's fees
227
in exceptional circumstances.
While this has been used a limited amount
in the past, courts need to be more willing to find that exceptional
circumstances exist where it is clear that patent infringement lawsuits are
being brought in bad faith. If the risks increase enough, then patent trolls
may stop making frivolous claims altogether.
Congress should codify the beneficial aspects of the state laws into
federal law to maintain the consistency that is valued so much in patent law.
Twenty-seven different states currently have laws against bad faith
assertions of patent infringement, 22 and other states are likely to pass

225. See, e.g., Mullin, supra note 54 (explaining East Texas judiciary's push to end
patent cases delays).
226. Catherine Rajwani, Controlling Costs in Patent Litigation, J. OF COMMERCIAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY
1, 1 (2010), http://www.harborlaw.com/publications/jcb20l06a.pdfio
technology (stating that the median litigation costs for each party is $350,000 through the end
of discovery and $650,000 through final disposition of the case).
227. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
228. ALA. CODE §§ 8-12A-1 to -7 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-12-101 to -104
(2013); FLA. STAT. §§ 501.991-997 (Supp. 2017); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-770 to -774
(2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-1701 to -1708 (2014); IND. CODE §§ 24-11-1-1 to -5-2
(2016); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6,140 (2015); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1428 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 8701-8702 (2013); MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-1601 to -1605 (2013); MIss. CODE. ANN. §§ 75-24-351 to -357
(2015); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 416.650-658 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-13-151 to -154
(2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-M:1 to :5 (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-140 to -145
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similar laws in the near future. Minor variations in each of these laws may
create more confusion leaving room for circuit splits, and this would be
contrary to patent laws fundamental goal to maintain consistency. In an
attempt to address the patent trolling issue, the House introduced a bill called
the Innovation Act in 2015.229 The Innovation Act has passed neither the
House nor the Senate, but hearings on this bill are still being held.230 The
Innovation Act would enact many of the provisions within the state patent
trolling laws into federal law, allowing these provisions to be applied
uniformly throughout the country.231
IV. CONCLUSION

Certain provisions within South Carolina's Bad Faith Assertion of
Patent Infringement Act may be preempted by federal patent law, but the
majority of the Act will likely survive preemption challenges. The law
allows states to punish frivolous, bad faith activity and contains beneficial
immunization provisions that shield some of the country's biggest
innovators from liability. To fully address the patent trolling problem,
federal courts and Congress will likely need to take further action. Federal
courts should be more willing to dismiss cases through motions to dismiss
and motions for summary judgment, and federal courts should also be more
willing to grant attorney's fees when it appears that a plaintiff in patent case
is acting in bad faith. Congress should continue its efforts towards enacting
laws to address the patent trolling problem.

(2014); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-36-01 to -08 (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 111-114
(2014); OR. LAWS 2014 ch. 19, § 2; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-36-1 to -9 (2015); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 29-10-101 to -104 (2015); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. §§ 17.951-955
(2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1901 to -1905 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-215.1 to
.4 (2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-4199 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 19.350.005.900 (2015); Wis. STAT. § 100.197 (2015).
229. inovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015).
230. Id.
231. Id.
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